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DISTINCTION BETWEEN

The
recent Supreme Court decision'in Le Tulle v. Scofield,' disapproving
SALE AND TAX EXEMPT REORGANIZATION UNDER SECTION 112 -

the views of four out of five circuit courts of appeals, 2 appears to add
a new and more specific requirement to the already complex law' on
the subject of statutory reorganization under the Revenue Act of
1928 t--that the consideration received by the transferor corporation
include some stock of the transferee corporation.' In the subject case,
" (U. S. 1940) 6o S. Ct. 313, noted 53 HARv. L. REv. 683 (1940).
2
Disapproved: Scofield v. Le Tulle, (C. C. A. 5th, 1939) 103 F. (zd)

20;

Commissioner v. Tyng, (C. C. A. zd, 1939) io6 F. (2d)' 55; Lilienthal v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 9 th, 1935) 80 F. (zd) 411; Commissioner v. Freund, (C. C. A.
3 d, 1938) 98 F. (zd) zoi. Approved: Averill v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. Ist, 1938)
1O1 F. (2d) 644. In Scofield v. Le Tulle, the circuit court of appeals held against the
taxpayer for other reasons.
8See: Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) 6o F. (zd)
937; Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U. S. 462, 53 S. Ct. 257
(1953); John A, Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U. S. 374, 5 6 S. Ct. 273 (935);
Hclvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U. S. 378, 56 S. Ct. 269 (i935); Helvering
v. Watts, 296 U. S. 387, 56 S. Ct. 275 (i935); G. & K. Mfg. Co. v. Helvering,
296 U. S. 389, 56 S. Ct. 276 (935); Bus & Transport Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 296 U. S. 391, 56 S. Ct. 277 (I935); Groman v. Commissioner, 302
U. S. 82, 58 S. Ct. io8 (i937); Helvering v. Bashford, 302 U. S. 454, 58 S. Ct.
307 (938).
.445 Stat. L. 791 at 816-817 (1928), 26 U. S. C. (934), § 112. See historical
note, z6 U. S. C. A. (1935), pp. 474-475.
5The definition of reorganization in the Revenue Acts of 1934 and subsequent
years requires, in the type of transaction discussed here, that the consideration received
be solely voting stock of the transferee. 26 U. S. C. (1994), § 112 (g) (I).
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the Gulf Coast Irrigation Company transferred substantially all its
assets to the Gulf Coast Water Company in exchange for $5o,ooo in
cash and $750,000 in mortgage bonds, four-fifths of which matured

serially over a period of twelve years. The Irrigation Company dissolved immediately after the exchange, and its assets were distributed
to Le Tulle as sole stockholder. In Helvering v. Tyng,8 considered
at the same time, Associated Gas & Electric Corporation acquired nearly
all the stock of two corporations in exchange for approximately
$34,000,000 in cash and approximately $I5,OOO,OOO in unsecured

bonds. The Court stated that the transferors did not retain any "proprietary interest" in the transferee corporations and held in both cases
that gain on the transaction was recognizable for income tax purposes.
The main question at issue-the nature of the consideration which
mn-ust be received in a statutory reorganization-has been the subject of
considerable litigation." The statutory provisions involved are the
sections describing the so-called "nontaxable" exchanges 8 and the
section defining reorganizations. The exchanges must be pursuant to
ca plan of reorganization" and require the receipt of at least some
Cstock or securities" in a corporate party to the reorganization.9 Gain
is recognized to the extent that "other property or money" is received."0
Reorganization was defined in the Revenue Act of 1928 to include:
"(A) a merger or consolidation (including the acquisition by
one corporation of at least a majority of the voting stock and at
least a majority of the total number of shares of all other classes
6 (U. S. 1940) 6o S. Ct. 378.
7 See cases cited in note 3, supra.
(b). The exchange sections have remained without

8 z6 U. S. C. (1934), § 1z

material change from 1924 to the present time. The sections relating to "exchanges
solely in kind" read as follows:
Sec. 112 (b) (3): "Stock for stock on reorganization. No gain or loss shall be
recognized if stock or securities in a corporation a party to a reorganization are, in
pursuance of the plan of reorganization, exchanged solely for stock or securities in such
corporation or in another corporation a party to the reorganization."
Sec. i i ? (b) (4): "Same-Gain of corporation. No gain or loss shall be recognized if a corporation a party to a reorganization exchanges property, in pursuance
of the plan of reorganization, solely for stock or securities in another corporation a
party to the reorganization."
I As to what constitutes "a party to a reorganization," see Groman v. Commissioner,
302 U. S. 8z, 58 S. Ct. 1O8 (937); Helvering v. Bashford, 302 U. S. 454, 58 S. Ct.
307 (1938); and Schuh Trading Co. v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 7 th, 1938) 95 F.
(2d) 404; all discussed in 36 MicH. L. REv. 1176 (1938).
'0 See "Exchanges not solely in kind," 26 U. S. C. (1934), § I12(c), (d), (e).
No gain is recognized to a corporation receiving such other property or money if it
distributes it in pursuance of a plan of reorganization. No loss is recognized when other
property or money is received.
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of stock of another corporation, or substantially all the properties
of another corporation). . .. " "
This definition is subject to a variety of interpretations." The idea
that it implicitly required some continuance of interest was first ex3 where it
pressed in Cortland Specialty Company v. Commissioner,"
was stated that the definition
"gives the widest room for all kinds of changes in corporate
structure, but does not abandon the primary requisite that there
must be some continuity of interest on the part of the transferor
corporation or its stockholders in order to secure exemption."' "
The case involved a transfer of assets for cash and short term (fifteen
months) notes. The court held that the consideration received must
include some "stock or securities" and that short-term notes were not
"securities." The opinion stated in part that:
"The very reason that [the section concerning exchange not'
solely in kind] requires that some of the property received in
exchange should be 'stock or securities' is to deprive a mere sale
for cash of the benefits of an exemption.... The situation might
be different had the 'securities,' though not in stock, created such
obligations as to give creditors or others some assured participatiori
in the properties of the transferor corporation." "
This statement relates the continuity of interest requirement to the
exchange sections and indicates that the necessary interest may be
present in some form other than stock.
The view expressed in the Cortland Specialty case was approved
11+s Stat. L. 817 (I928), since amended by 48 Stat. L. 704. (I934.), 26
U. S. C. (1934), § 112(0).
"For example: "it is only when there is an acquisition of substantially all the
property of another corporation in connection with a merger or consolidation that a
reorganization takes place." Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, (C. C. A.
5th, 1932) 57 F. (2d) 188 at 19o. The court also pointed out that "Congress intended to use the words 'merger' or 'consolidation' in their ordinary and accepted
meanings" and that such meaning requires the extinguishment or dissolution of one or
more corporations. When the Supreme Court affirmed the decision it stated that the
view of the circuit court of appeals was too narrow. 287 U. S. 462 at 469, 53 S. Ct.

257 (1933).

For an outline of the principles established in interpreting this clause, see Commissioner v. Kitselman, (C. C. A. 7 th, 1937) 89 F. (2d) 458 at 460. See also MAGILL,
TAXABLE INCOME 131-139 (936); 2 PAUL and MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATIoN 140 et seq. (1934).

13 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) 6o F. (2d) 937, cert. den. 288 U. S. 599, 53 S. Ct. 316

(1933).

14 6o F. (2d) 937 at 94o.
15 Ibid.
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by the Supreme Court in Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Company v.
Commissioner,8 which likewise concerned short-term notes.
In
Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Company'8 it added that the interest
must be "definite and material" and "represent a substantial part of
the value of the thing transferred" 9 but found that requirement satisfied where stock and a large amount of cash were received. In John
A. Nelson Company v. Helvering ° non-voting preferred stock was
held to meet the requirement, the Court stating that the statute does
not require participation in the management of the transferee. 2 In
Groman v. Commissioner' the Supreme Court stated as the purpose
of the reorganization sections, that
"where, pursuant to a plan, the interest of the stockholders of a
corporation continues to be definitely represented in substantial
measure in a new or different one, then to the extent, but only to
the extent, of that continuity of interest, the exchange is to be
treated as one not giving rise to present gain or loss." 23
If the gain on the exchange is exempt to the extent of the "continuity
of interest" it would seem to follow that continuity of interest is coextensive with the receipt of "stock or securities," because that is the
measure of exemption under the exchange sections and only the exchange sections deal with gain or loss.
The first case involving bonds to reach the Supreme Court was
Helvering v. Watts." There the transferor received common stock
and mortgage bonds,25 and the Court held there was a statutory reor2 287 U. S. 462, 53 S. Ct. 257 (1933). "The words within the parenthesis...
expand the meaning of 'merger' or 'consolidation' so as to include some things which
partake of the nature of a merger or consolidation but are beyond the ordinary and
commonly accepted meaning of those words." 287 U. S. at 469-470.
27 ..
. the mere purchase for money of the assets of one Company by another
is beyond the evident purpose of the provision. . . . To be within the exemption the
seller must acquire an interest in the affairs of the purchasing company more definite
than that incident to ownership of its short-term purchase-money notes. This general
view is adopted and well sustained in Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, [(C. C. A. 2d, 1932)] 6o F. (2d) 937, 939, 940. It harmonizes
with the underlying purpose of the provisions in respect of exemptions and gives some
effect to all the words employed." Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner,
287 U. S. 462 at 470, 53 S. Ct. 257 (1933).
18296 U. S. 378, 56 S. Ct. 269 (1935).
Ibid., 296 U. S. at 385.
20 296 U. S. 374, 56 S. Ct. 273 (I935).
1'Ibid., 296 U. S. at 377.
2 302 U. S. 82, 58 S. Ct. IO8 (1937).

Ibid., 302 U. S. at 89.
U. S.387, 56 S. Ct. 275 (i935).
2" The bonds were obligations of the transferor guaranteed by the transferee. The
property securing the bonds was transferred in the reorganization.
28

24296
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ganization. It likewise disapproved the commissioner's contention that
the bonds constituted "other property or money" and in so doing held
that the bonds were "securities." 2
The consideration received in the subject case included no stock
but consisted merely of cash and bonds. Prior to the Watts case there
had been two circuit court of appeals cases of this type. In the first,
Worcester Salt Company v. Commissioner," the Circuit Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit denied exemption, stating that "like
the notes in the Pinellascase, bonds are merely an evidence of indebtedness." 2 But in the second case, Lilienthal v. Commissioner," exemp-

tion was granted, apparently with a misunderstanding of the statute.
Subsequent to the Watts decision there were four circuit court of ap-

1 Averill v. Compeals cases of this type:" Commissioner v. Freund,"
2
8
missioner, Scofield v. Le Tulle and Commissioner v. Tyng."4 Only
20o It is also urged that an exchange of stocks for bonds results in a substantial
change of position and that such bonds are 'other property' within the meaning of the
statute and as such subject to tax. Much of the argument presented is the same as the
one considered in the Minnesota Tea Company case, and it need not be again
followed in detail. The bonds, we think, were securities within the definition and
cannot be regarded as cash, as were the short term notes referred to in Pinellas Ice Co.
Y. Commissioner, 287 U. S. 462." Helvering v. Watts, 296 U. S. 387 at 389, 56
S. Ct. 275 (1935).
27 (C, C. A. 2d, 1935) 75 F. (2d) 251.
28 Ibid., at 252. The transaction involved affiliated corporations and was deemed
nontaxable as an intercompany transaction. However, the statement that continuity
of interest was lacking can not be regarded as mere dictum. The controversy arose upon
the sale of the bonds and if they had been received in a statutory reorganization would
have had a higher cost basis.
The conclusion was followed by the Board of Tax Appeals. Hay Foundry &
Iron Works v. Commissioner, 33 B. T. A. 144- (1935); McNab v. Commissioner,
33 B. T. A. 192 at 197 (1935).'
29 (C. C. A. 9 th, 1935) 80 F. (2d) 411. The case concerned the acquisition by
one corporation of more than a majority of stock of another corporation in exchange
for cash and ten-year collateral trust bonds. The court erroneously stated that the
Cortland Specialty, Worcester Salt and other cases came under a different portion
(Clause B) of the definition of reorganization. Ibid., at 412.
80 There have been two cases in which bonds were the consideration delivered up:
Burnham v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 7th, 1936) 86 F. (2d) 776, cert. den. 300
U. S. 683, 57 S. Ct. 753 (937), where stock was received for ten-year judgment
notes in a recapitalization; and Commissioner v. Kitselman, (C. C. A. 7 th, 1937) 89
F. (2d) 458, cert. den. sub nom. Kitselman v. Helvering, 302 U. S. 709, 58 S. Ct.
29 (1937), where stock and bonds of a new corporation were received for defaulted
mortgage bonds.
81 (C. C. A. 3 d, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 201.
82 (C. C.A. Ist, 1938) ioi F. (2d) 644.
8 (C. C.A. 5 th, 1939) 103 F. (2d) 20.
84 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) Io6 F. (2d) 55. The Board of Tax Appeals reversed its
position. See Kaspare Cohn Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 35 B. T. A. 64.6 (937), and
Segall v. Commissioner, 38 B. T. A. 43 (1938) The Court of Claims found a statu-
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the Averill case denied a reorganization, but there the bonds matured
serially and the court found that both parties contemplated "a sale
payable in installments." In its opinion the court stated that the Watts
case did not decide that "the ownership of bonds without stocks ever
constitutes such a continuing interest as is essential to a statutory
reorganization." 5
The Freund case and Scofield v. Le Tulle found that bonds could
give the necessary interest but their lines of reasoning differed. The
conclusion in the Freund case seems to result from associating the
continuity of interest requirement with the exchange sections and
adopting the holding in the Watts case that bonds are "securities."
After quoting from the Groman case the statement discussed above, the
court stated that:
"The required continuing interest of a stockholder who transfers his shares in a statutory reorganization may be retained in the
form of bonds ... since these are securities within the meaning of
paragraph (b) (3).... [16] The purpose of the use of the phrase

'stock or securities in such corporation or in another corporation a
party to the reorganization' is to describe the form in which the
continuing interest of the transferor in a reorganization may be
represented under the terms of the statute.""
In Scofield v. Le Tulle the court relied not upon the Watts case but
upon the Nelson case (in which cash and non-voting preferred stock
was received). It stated that "Long time notes or bonds... may, like
preferred stock, represent a definite and substantial interest"88 in
the transferee. It may be assumed that the basic reasoning of the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the Tyng case was the same
as that in the Freund case, 9 although the court dealt mainly with
tory reorganization where stock in six corporations was exchanged for cash and bonds
maturing in four to six years. White v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1938) z F. Supp. 8i.
Il Averill v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 1st, 1938) ioi F. (2d) 644 at 647.
3' Citing Helvering v. Watts, 296 U. S. 387, 56 S. Ct. 275 (i935); Lilienthal v.
Commissioner, (C. C. A. 9th, 1935) 8o F. (zd) 411; Burnham v. Commissioner,
(C. C. A. 7 th, 1936) 86 F. (2d) 776; Commissioner v. Kitselman, (C. C. A. 7th,
1937) 89 F. (2d) 458. _
8"Commissioner v. Freund, (C. C. A. 3d, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 201 at 205.
88 Scofield v. Le Tulle, (C. C. A. 5 th, 1939) io3 F. (2d) 2o at 22.
That the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit believes that the
continuity of interest requirement grew out of the exchange sections is evident in
its opinion in L. & E. Stirn, Inc. v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) 107 F.
(2d) 390. In that case preferred stock was surrendered for retirement in exchange for
debenture bonds having an average maturity of two and a half years but actually paid
off within ten months. The court stated that the retirement of the preferred stock
constituted a "recapitalization" (and hence a "reorganization") but held that the
gain upon the exchange was recognizable because the bonds "did not furnish a con-
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distinguishing its decision in the Worcester Salt case4 ' and refuting
the commissioner's argument that unsecured bonds were distinguishable
from secured bonds. "'
The fact situation in the Tyng case differs somewhat from that of

Scofield v. Le Tulle. The former concerns the transfer of stock4 2 for

cash and twenty and forty year unsecured bonds while the latter involves the transfer of corporate assets for bonds maturing serially over
a period of twelve years. The Supreme Court seems to place its decision
in the Le Tulle case not upon any peculiarity of the facts "3 but rather
upon broad principles. Its opinion reads in part as follows:
"In applying our decision in the Pinellas case, t "3 the courts
have generally held that receipt of long term bonds as distinguished from short term notes constitutes the retention of an
interest in the purchasing corporation. There has naturally been
in classifying the securities involved in various
some 4difficulty
51
cases.1

tinuity of interest . . . sufficient to bring them within the meaning of 'securities.'"
Ibid., at 392. The court denied exemption for want of a continuing interest while
admitting that there was a reorganization.
40 The Tyng case involved 2o and 40 year bonds, and the court distinguished the
Worcester Sale case on the grounds that the bonds in that case were "apparently five
year bonds" and, like the notes in the Cortland Specialty and Pinellas cases, were not
long-term obligations. Commissioner v. Tyng, (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) io6 F. (2d) 55
at 58.
41The commissioner contended that "while secured bonds may preserve a continuity of ownership, unsecured bonds do not." The court stated: "Unsecured bondholders are more substantially subjected to the risk of the business than mortgage bondholders." Ibid., io6 F. (2d) 55 at 59.
42 The fact that the important cases discussing the continuity of interest requirement have concerned transfers of corporate properties rather than stock might lead
to the misbelief that the requirement does not apply where corporate stock is transferred, e.g., the circuit court of appeals, in Scofield v. Le Tulle, (C. C. A. 5th 1939)
103 F. (2d) 2o at 22, stated in a footnote that: "the Watts case did not arise under
the clause of the statute about acquiring substantially all of the properties of another
corporation, but concerned the preceding clause about acquiring a majority of stock. It
did not really matter whether the bonds received were the equivalent of cash or not,
as all the stock was acquired, which by itself made a reorganization."
48 It might be contended that in both cases there was in substance a "sale." In the
Tyng case the original intent of the transferee was to purchase the stock for cash and
in Scofield v. Le Tulle the fact that the bonds matured serially over a period of 12
years might indicate an installment sale. However, similar contentions probably could
be made of almost any case in which no stock was received.
"Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, z87 U. S.462, 53 S. Ct.
257 (1933)45 Citing Worcester Salt Co. v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) 75 F. (ad)
251; Lilienthal v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 9th, 1935) 8o F. (zd) 411 at 413;
Burnham v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 7th, 1936) 86 F. (ad) 776; Commissioner v.
Kitselman, (C. C. A. 7 th, 1937) 89 F. (zd) 458; Commissioner v. Freund, (C. C. A.
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"We are of opinion that the term of the obligations is not
material. Where the consideration is wholly in the transferee's
bonds, or part cash and part such bonds, we think it cannot be
said that the transferor retains any proprietary interest in the
enterprise. On the contrary, he becomes a creditor of the transfereei and we do not think that the fact referred to by the Circuit
Court of Appeals, that the bonds were secured solely by the assets
transferred and that, upon default, the bondholder would retake
only the property sold, changes his status from that of a creditor
to one having a proprietary stake, within the purview of the
statute."

4

The statement that "the term of the obligations is not materiaP
and the reference to a "proprietary interest in the enterprise" makes
it doubtful whether bonds of any ordinary type could represent the
required interest. In using the adjective "proprietary" the court adds
something to the requirements laid down in the Minmesota Tea case."7
As only a stockholder could have such an interest, it must follow
that the requirement of continuity of interest is unrelated to the
exchange sections, which use the words "stock or securities." The
requirement must be regarded as something implied in the definition
of reorganization. This appears out of harmony with what was said
in the Cortland Specialty case and implied in the Groman case. Congressional intent would probably support any implication necessary to
prevent sales of assets from being deemed reorganizations, but it would
seem that the receipt of cash and bonds is in general no more indicative
of a sale than the receipt of cash and preferred stock." There is little
more than a formal distinction between the long-term bonds of some
corporations and the preferred stock of certain other corporations."'
1938) 98 F. (zd) 2oI; Commissioner v. Tyng, (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) io6 F.
55; L. & E. Stirn, Inc. v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. zd, 1939) 107 F. (2d)
3 Le Tulle v. Scofield, (U. S. i94o) 6o
S. Ct. 313 at 316.
47 Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U. S. 378, 56 S. Ct. 269 (1935),
discussed, supra, at note 18.
"The legislative intent expressed when the definition was first introduced (i 9zi)
does not seem to demand a sharp distinction between stocks and bonds. See, SEIDMAN,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY Or FEDERAL I-NcomE TAX LAWS 1938-1861, pp. 790-797
(938).
The changes made in the definition by the Revenue Act of 1934 (see note 5,
supra) are doubtless too sweeping to be deemed declaratory. Even the Minnesota Tea,
Nelson and Watts cases could not have satisfied the new definition requiring the receipt
of only voting stock.
49 In some instances "preferred stock" has been treated as evidence of an indebtedness for the purpose of allowing a deduction for interest. Commissioner v. Proctor
Shop, Inc., (C. C. A. 9th, 1936) 82 F. (2d) 79z; Palmer, Stacy-Merrill, Inc. v.
3 d,

(2d)
390.
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There appears to be no real substantial difference between the subject
case and the Nelson case. This lack of genuine difference may reflect
upon the latter case, and efforts at distinguishing it may be successful
where preferred stock has some of the characteristics of bonds or is
received in transactions having the indicia of a sale.
The Le Tulle v. Scofield decision has merit in that it eliminates
occasions for deciding whether particular bonds are
one of the main
"securities." 50 Likewise, it denies exemption to a transfer which, prior
to 1936, might have resulted in a "stepped-up" basis for corporate
properties 51 and renders ineffective some of the tax-avoiding attempts
at casting sales in the form of reorganizations. It does not say that
bonds cannot be "securities," 52 and the hope is that it does not affect
the continuity of interest requirement in such a way as to preclude
reorganizations by bondholders. In the usual statement of the requirement, the interest to be continued is that of the transferor corporation
or its stockholders. One of the commonest types of reorganization in
recent years has been the sort instigated by holders of defaulted mortgage bonds, and usually in such cases only the bondholders receive
any stock in the transferee corporation. Such a situation appeared in
Commissioner v. Kitselman5 and the court of appeals found a statutory
Commissioner, 37 B. T. A. 530 (1938). See also Commissioner v. 0. P. P. Holding
Corp., (C. C. A. zd, 1935) 76 F. (zd) ii.
50 The problem of deciding whether particular bonds are securities has developed
some difficulties, as the Supreme Court stated, and also some inconsistencies. In Segall
v. Commissioner, 38 B. T. A. 43 (1938), a statutory reorganization was found where
the consideration received consisted of cash and bonds maturing in two to five years.
In the Worcester Salt case, a statutory reorganization was denied although the bonds
o
had a maturity of five years and no cash was recaived. See note 4 , supra; Commissioner
v. Tyng, (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) io6 F. (ad) 55 at 58.
I" Under the Revenue Acts of 1932 and 1934 the transferee's basis of properties
acquired in a reorganization was not the same as the transferor's unless "immediately
after the transfer an interest or control in such property of 50 per centum or more
remained in the same persons or any of them." 47 Stat. L. 199 (1932), 26 U. S. C. A.
(I935), p. 49o; 48 Stat. L. 707 (1934), 26 U. S. C. (I934), § 113(a) (7). Under
the Revenue Acts of 1924, 1926 and 1928 an interest or control of 8o per cent was
required. 43 Stat. L. 259 (I924), 44 Stat. L. 15 (1926), 45 Stat. L. 818 (1928),
z6 U. S. C. A. (935), pp. 492, 493.
52 The decision should not affect cases like Burnham v. Commissioner, (C. C. A.
7th, 1936) 86F. (2d) 776, where bonds or notes enter the picture merely as the
consideration delivered, or Helvering v. Watts, 296 U. S. 387, 56 S. Ct. 275 (I93S),
when the question is whether "other property or money" was received.
I' (C. C. A. 7 th, 1937) 89 F. (zd) 458, cert. den. sub nom. Kitselman v. Helvering, 302 U. S. 709, 58 S. Ct. 29 (1937). For other cases involving the reorganization
of financially distressed corporations, see C. H. Mead Coal Co. v. Commissioner,
(C. C. A. 4 th, 1934) 72 F. (2d) 22 (stockholders of transferor corporation participated); Commissioner v. Newberry Lumber & Chemical Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1938)
94 F. (2d) 447; Tiscornia v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 9 th, 1938) 95 F. (zd) 678;
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reorganization, stating that the bondholders "must be viewed as a
class of 'Stockholders."'5 It would seem that the decision in Le Tulle
v. Scofield should not affect that type of transaction. The reasons for
requiring a stock interest after the transfer do not necessitate an actual
stock interest before the transfer. The continuity of interest requirement was developed mainly to rule out sales of assets, and when holders
of defaulted bonds obtain stock for their interests, they are not "selling out" but "buying in." If the decision means that there must be a
stock interest before the transfer, it affects reorganizations occurring in
1934 and subsequent years under the revised definition as well as the
tax cost basis of securities involved in "reorganizations" which occurred prior to the year 1934"

Henry J. Merry *
Leckie v. Commissioner, 37 B. T. A. z77 (1938) (arising after the Revenue Act
of 1934. had revised the definition of reorganization).
By its nature, a reorganization of this type usually results in a loss. In the Kitselman, Mead Coal, Tiscornia and Leckie cases, the loss was held nondeductible. In the
Newberry Lumber case the issue was as to the tax cost basis of the transferred property
and the transferee was allowed to use the transferor's basis.
In United States v. Galveston-Houston Electric Co., (C. C. A. ist, 1936) 84F. (2d) 516, a loss was held deductible in a somewhat different fact situation.
"4Commissioner v. Kitselman, (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) 89 F. (zd) 458 at 461.
This conclusion would not apply to all bondholders. The court added: "Where the
assets of the corporation fall far below the amount required to pay the bondholders in
full, the bondholders in bankruptcy reorganization supersede the stockholders. They
acquire the stockholders' rights to manage the corporate affairs." Ibid. The circuit
court of appeals reversed the Board of Tax Appeals. Kitselman v. Commissioner, 33
B. T. A. 494. The board stated (at p. 500): "Neither the [old corporation] nor its
stockholders were parties to the plan, nor did either that corporation or its stockholders
acquire any interest in the [new corporation]. On their part there was no continuity of
interest in the new corporation and therefore no statutory reorganization."
1548 Stat. L. 707, 26 U. S. C. (1934), § 113(a) (7).
* Member of the Illinois and Michigan bars; C.P.A., Illinois; A.B., LL.B., Michigan.-Ed.

